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INTRODUCTION
Many of us get transferred to unfamiliar cities, states, or
even countries for our jobs. Moving outside of one’s home
country can be daunting when one is faced with a new home,
friends, culture, and laws. Unsuspecting newcomers can get
caught violating rules they were never even aware existed. That
is exactly what happened to investor Keith.
After working at ABC Company in New York City for ten
years, Keith was relocated to Canada. Keith and his family left
their lives in New York but maintained their US citizenship in
anticipation of eventually returning home. After getting settled
in Canada, Keith, a middle aged man, wanted to invest some of
his savings within the country he was living. Keith met an
investment adviser who suggested he consider investing in a
mutual fund, an investment vehicle that pools money from many
different investors, like Keith, to invest in a portfolio of
securities, including stocks, bonds, and other funds.1 Keith
could purchase shares of a mutual fund while only paying a
nominal fee to reap the benefits of the mutual funds’
professional management.2 Keith thought paying a minimal

1. See Mutual Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, http://investor.gov/investing-basics/
investment-products/mutual-funds#.UrSk_amWGRI (last visited Dec. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Mutual Funds] (exploring the mutual fund asset class); Mutual Funds
Explained, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/money101/
lesson6/index2.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Mutual Funds Explained]
(defining what a mutual fund is).
2. See CANADIAN REVENUE AGENCY, RC4169(E), TAX TREATMENT OF MUTUAL
FUNDS FOR INDIVIDUALS 1, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/rc4169/rc4169-12e.pdf
[hereinafter CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS] (explaining how Canadian mutual
funds operate); CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, UNDERSTANDING MUTUAL
FUNDS
2,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Investors/res_mutual-funds_
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service fee for the shares sounded promising because,
presumably, a knowledgeable and skilled professional would
select a variety of securities that would earn Keith more money
than if he did so on his own.3
Following this advice, Keith invested US$1000 in Mutual
Fund XYZ in 1993. Twenty years later, in 2012, Keith was ecstatic
that his investment had grown to US$21,000, and cashed out.
When Keith’s tax consultant noticed this US$20,000 gain, he was
surprised. After doing the math, the consultant told Keith he
owed US$19,416 out of this US$20,000 to the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”), the US government agency responsible for
collecting taxes. Keith was sure this had to be a mistake.
Unbeknownst to Keith, however, the mutual fund, a seemingly
mainstream investment vehicle, was plagued by the Passive
Foreign Investment Company (“PFIC”) taint. The PFIC rules
impose penalties for tax deferral on income not actually
received, higher tax rates and burdensome compliance costs.
It is estimated that, just like Keith, over one million US
taxpayers own Canadian mutual funds and, consequently, are
impacted by the PFIC rules.4 And, like Keith, many of these
investors are unaware that they own shares in a PFIC or the tax
consequences and filing requirements of such investments.
Aiming to encourage continued investment in Canadian mutual
funds, the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (“IFIC”) is
currently lobbying the US Congress to exempt Canadian mutual
funds from the PFIC categorization.5
en.pdf [hereinafter CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS] (articulating the advantages of investing
in Canadian mutual fund).
3. See CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (proposing the benefits of
mutual fund investments); Mutual Funds, supra note 1 (emphasizing the advantages of
mutual funds, namely professional management).
4. See Jamie Golombek, Americans in Canada: Tax Problems Grow, FIN. POST
(Toronto), Apr. 20, 2013, http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/20/americansin-canada-tax-problems-grow (illuminating the widespread impact of the Passive
Foreign Investment Company (“PFIC”) regime); Rudy Mezzetta, IFIC Asks for Changes to
PFIC Rules, INV. EXEC. (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.investmentexecutive.com/-/ificasks-for-changes-to-pfic-rules (highlighting the number of US taxpayer in Canada
impacted by the PFIC regime).
5. See Mezzetta, supra note 4 (discussing the Investment Fund Institute of Canada
(“IFIC”) effort to exempt Canadian mutual funds). See generally Letter from Joanne De
Laurenttis, President & CEO, The Inv. Funds Inst. of Can., to Honorable Adrian Smith,
Chair & Honorable John Larson, Vice-Chair, Fin. Servs. Working Group, H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, U.S.H.R. 1 (Apr. 15, 2013) [hereinafter IFIC Letter], available at
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A PFIC is a non-US asset that generates a threshold amount
of passive income.6 The IRS has created strict guidelines
imposing astronomical taxes, rapidly accumulating interest and
penalty charges, significant compliance costs, and overall
confusion on the PFIC.7 In some circumstances, as with Keith,
the total PFIC tax can come close to or even surpass the total
income earned.8 This then poses the question—why would
someone like Keith invest in an asset that is categorized as a
PFIC?
Despite the difficulties with the PFIC regime, assets
considered PFICs still offer US investors certain advantages.9
Most importantly, US investors are encouraged to diversify their
portfolios by investing in a wide spectrum of asset classes, risk
levels, and countries.10 PFIC assets can assist in achieving this
investment objective.11 Specifically, the mutual fund vehicle
offers this sought-after diversification at a low cost by pooling
money collected from a variety of individuals to purchase many
different securities.12 Mutual funds are also advantageous

https://www.ific.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Submission-Financial-ServicesWorking-Group-Ways-and-Means-Committee-Smith-and-Larson-PFIC-R.pdf/5299/
(lobbying the United States to exempt Canadian mutual funds and the rationale).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 1297(a) (2012) (defining what is considered a PFIC).
7. See generally IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (outlining problems with the PFIC
regime that discourages investment in non-US passive assets); N.Y.C. BAR, REPORT
OFFERING PROPOSED GUIDANCE REGARDING THE PASSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
COMPANY RULES (2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/
20071778-ReportRePassiveForeignInvestmentCompanyRules.pdf (addressing issues
with the current Passive Foreign Investment Company (“PFIC”) framework).
8. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 11, 13 (exemplifying the excessive distribution
regime).
9. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (proposing reasons for investing in PFICs). See
generally VANGUARD RESEARCH, CONSIDERATIONS FOR INVESTING IN NON-U.S. EQUITIES
(2012), available at http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/icriecr.pdf (discussing opportunity
for US investors to own non-US assets, including those considered PFICs).
10. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (highlighting advantages of foreign
investment). See generally VANGUARD RESEARCH, supra note 9 (explaining reasons for US
investors to diversify their portfolios and invest in non-US assets).
11. See Mutual Funds, supra note 1 (identifying advantages of the mutual fund,
including facilitating diversification). See generally VANGUARD RESEARCH, supra note 9
(encouraging US investors to diversify their investment portfolios).
12. See Mutual Funds, supra note 1 (exploring how the mutual fund operates by
pooling money to invest in a variety of assets); Mutual Funds Explained, supra note 1
(describing how the mutual fund is a pooled investment vehicle facilitating
diversification).
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because they are widely available and highly liquid. 13 This means
mutual funds can easily be bought or sold on the market. A
mutual fund has the added benefit of employing the service of a
professional manager for a relatively low cost.14 Accordingly,
individual investors lack control over the composition of the
fund and regulators require the mutual fund managers to
provide certain disclosures to investors, thereby facilitating
transparency.15
Non-US managed mutual funds, which qualify as PFICs,
provide investors with exposure not only to international assets,
but also further diversification with respect to strategies,
managers, and techniques.16 While US mutual funds also
provide exposure to international assets, there is no evidence
that US managers are superior to international managers.17 The
current US taxation system, however, creates a major
impediment to US investors attempting to reap the benefits of
international mutual funds by imposing higher tax rates,
penalties, and compliance obstacles.18
While legislators had valid reasons for promulgating the
PFIC regulations, namely to discourage US citizens from
deferring or avoiding US taxation by investing in non-US
corporations, the PFIC rules are over-inclusive19 In practice, the
13. See CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (noting mutual funds are highly
liquid assets); Mutual Funds, supra note 1 (finding liquidity to be among the many
benefits of the mutual fund vehicle).
14. See CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (highlighting the relatively low
cost of investing in a mutual fund); Mutual Funds, supra note 1 (finding investors chose
to invest in mutual funds to reap the benefits of affordable professional management).
15. See See CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 6 (outlining how investors in
Canadian mutual funds are protected). See generally IFIC Letter, supra note 5
(explaining that Canada is not a tax haven and is highly regulated similar to the United
States).
16. E.g., IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (promoting investment in Canadian
mutual funds). See VANGUARD RESEARCH, supra note 9 (promoting investor
diversification).
17. See generally IFIC Letter, supra note 5 (exploring reasons why investors should
not be discouraged from investing in Canadian mutual funds).
18. See generally Golombek, supra note 4 (illuminating the problems for US
taxpayers when foreign mutual funds are treated as PFICs); Mezzetta, supra note 4
(arguing that the PFIC rules will discourage investment in Canadian mutual funds).
19. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. DOC. NO. 3838, at 1023 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986], available at http://
www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf (explaining the rationale for enacting the PFIC regulations);
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PFIC regime captures assets that do not facilitate the legislative
intent of preventing tax evasion and tax deferral.20 Specifically,
the inclusion of certain regulated Canadian assets in the PFIC
rules is improper because, unlike the Cayman Islands, Bermuda,
or Luxembourg, Canada is certainly not a tax haven.21 US
investors do not exploit Canadian mutual funds to avoid or
defer US taxation.22 Hence, subjecting US investors in Canadian
mutual funds to the PFIC rules causes such investors, just like
Keith, to incur a combination of higher tax rates, interest for
underpayment of phantom income taxes, and penalty charges—
all without serving a clearly delineated legislative purpose.23
This Comment focuses on the PFIC regime and the
inclusion of the Canadian mutual fund. Part I of this Comment
provides an overview of the PFIC regime and the treatment of
Canadian mutual funds. Part II next outlines the issues,
inefficiencies, and conflicts with the PFIC regime, specifically
related to Canadian mutual funds. Part III proposes amending
the United States-Canada Income Tax Convention to exempt
Canadian mutual funds from the draconian results of the PFIC
regime.

IFIC Letter, supra note 5 (describing how the PFIC rules are over-inclusive by
incorporating the Canadian mutual fund).
20. See Kimberley S. Blanchard, PFICs, 6300-1ST, TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) Foreign
Income, at II.A-1 (2012), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/p/413136a3746d6dd26afac
c7888c8f11f/document/2759533096 (outlining the reasons for the PFIC rules); IFIC
Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing there is no reason to include Canadian mutual funds
in the PFIC category).
21. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 3 (challenging the application of the PFIC
regime to Canada); see also Lisa Mahapatra, Tax Havens: A Map of Former, Current and
Emerging Tax Shelter Countries, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://
www.ibtimes.com/tax-havens-map-former-current-emerging-tax-shelter-countriesinteractive-map-1403162 (listing countries that are tax havens, not including Canada);
Richard Murphy, World’s Best Tax Havens, FORBES (July 6, 2010), http://
www.forbes.com/2010/07/06/tax-havens-delaware-bermuda-markets-singaporebelgium.html (listing the top ten tax havens).
22. See Lucy S. Lee & Stafford Smiley, Taxation of Passive Foreign Investment
Companies: Current Rules, Problems and Possible Solutions, 38 WGL-CTAX 39, 43 (2011)
(explaining the issues with the PFIC regime); see also IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 3
(challenging application of the PFIC regime to Canada).
23. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 1 (critiquing the PFIC rules and ineffectiveness
of the available elections); see also Mezzetta, supra note 4 (explaining the problem with
the PFIC regime for Canadian mutual funds).
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I. THE PFIC REGIME
The PFIC regulations are incredibly complicated. Investors
have trouble not only determining whether they own a PFIC, but
also adequately complying with the regulations once ownership
becomes apparent. Thus, Part I of this Comment explains the
PFIC tax regime to highlight the issues associated with
subjecting Canadian mutual funds to PFIC treatment. Part I.A
first provides an overview of the PFIC regime. Part I.B then
explores the three different PFIC regimes: Excess Distribution
Regime, Qualified Election Fund (“QEF”), and Mark-to-Market
(“MTM”). Part I.C describes the foreign tax credit, and Part I.D
highlights the filing and compliance costs under the PFIC
regime. Lastly, Part I.E discusses the Canadian mutual fund
PFIC, and its treatment in Canada and the United States.
A. Overview of the PFIC
The PFIC is any non-US asset that generates passive
income.24 Passive income is defined as income “generated from
[a non-US] personal holding company.”25 This generally
includes non-US income derived from dividends, interest,
royalties, rent, commodity transactions, foreign currency gains,
and certain property transactions.26
By enacting the PFIC regime, the US legislature intended
to eliminate tax deferral and evasion that resulted from
investing outside the United States.27 Legislators wanted to
prevent US taxpayers from avoiding the required current
taxation on all assets by investing in the same passive US assets
indirectly through a non-US investment vehicle.28 Prior to the
PFIC regulations, investors could defer taxation without penalty

24. See 26 U.S.C. § 1297(a) (2012) (defining the PFIC).
25. § 954(c) (explaining what is considered passive income).
26. Id. (providing examples of passive income).
27. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 19 (exploring
the rationale for enacting the PFIC regulation). See generally Lee & Smiley, supra note
22 (articulating the purpose of the PFIC rules to eliminate advantages of foreign
investment).
28. Accord EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 19
(exploring the reasoning for the PFIC regulation); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 1
(finding the purpose of the PFIC rules is to eliminate advantages of international
investment).
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until the gains were realized by investing through an
international corporation rather than a US investment
company.29 In doing so, investors could convert income, which
should be treated as ordinary income, into the more favorable
capital gains income.30 In essence, the PFIC regulations were
promulgated to target individuals utilizing international
investment corporations to gain US tax advantages.31
To determine if an international asset is considered a PFIC
for US tax purposes, there is an income test and an asset test.32
Under the income test, an international corporation is
considered a PFIC if “75 percent or more of the gross income”
in that taxable year is passive income.33 Under the asset test, an
international corporation is a PFIC if fifty percent or more of
the average percentage of assets during that taxable year
produce, or are held for the production of, passive income.34
For purposes of conducting the two tests, an investor must
apply the “look-through” rules if a foreign corporation owns
(directly or indirectly) at least twenty-five percent of another
corporation.35 “[S]uch foreign corporation shall be treated as if
it (1) held its proportionate share of assets of such other
corporation and (2) received directly its proportionate share of
the income of such corporation.”36

29. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 19, at 1023
(stating what investors were doing prior to the PFIC rules to gain tax advantages);
N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 1 (finding the PFIC rules were created in response to
investors abusing international investment vehicles for advantageous taxation).
30. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 19, at 1023
(highlighting how the PFIC sought to prevent investors from using international
corporations to convert ordinary income into the advantageous capital gains); N.Y.C.
BAR, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining how investors were converting ordinary income into
capital gains prior to the PFIC rules).
31. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 19, at 1023
(exploring the reasoning Congress needed to enact the PFIC rules); Blanchard, supra
note 20, at II.A-1 (articulating the purpose of the PFIC regime to eliminate foreign tax
advantages).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 1297(a) (2012) (explaining the PFIC tests); see Blanchard, supra
note 20, at II.C (stating if an asset passes either the asset or income test it is subject to
the PFIC rules).
33. § 1297(a)(1) (describing the income test).
34. § 1297(a)(2) (articulating the asset test).
35. § 1297(c) (outlining when to apply the look-through rules).
36. Id. (indicating how to apply the look-through rules).
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In addition to the asset and income tests, an asset can also
be subject to the PFIC regime under the “once a PFIC, always a
PFIC” rule.37 Under this rule, an asset is treated as a PFIC,
regardless if it passes the asset or income test for the year, if at
any time during the taxpayer’s holding period the asset was a
PFIC and no election was made.38 Thus, even if the asset no
longer meets the asset or income test in later years, the PFIC
continues to be subject to the excess distribution regime
because no election was made and such PFIC is considered
tainted.39 The PFIC taint can be avoided if an investor makes the
QEF election in year one of the holding period (referred to as a
pedigreed PFIC) or later makes a purging election.40
A purging election is essentially a deemed sale or dividend
distribution from the PFIC where the sale or dividend is subject
to the excess distribution regime just this one time.41 After this
deemed sale or dividend distribution, a new holding period
begins for a pedigreed PFIC no longer subject to the PFIC
taint.42 The purging election is the next best option when an
investor misses a filing deadline because only under rare
circumstances can an investor make a retroactive election.43

37. § 1298(b)(1) (stating the “once a PFIC, always a PFIC” rule); see Blanchard,
supra note 20, at X.A (indicating there is a PFIC taint under certain circumstances)
38. § 1298(b)(1) (explaining how the “once a PFIC, always a PFIC” rule
operates); see N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 20 (analyzing the “once a PFIC, always a
PFIC” restriction).
39. § 1298(b)(1) (stating the “once a PFIC, always a PFIC”); see Blanchard, supra
note 20, at X.A (exploring the PFIC taint).
40. § 1298(b)(1) (time for determining PFIC status); see Blanchard, supra note 20,
at X.A (identifying the exceptions to the PFIC taint).
41. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at X.B (describing the purging election as a
method to eliminate the PFIC taint); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 20 (identifying how to
purge the PFIC taint).
42. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at X.B (stating after the purging election, a new
holding period begins where the PFIC taint no longer applies); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note
7, at 20 (explaining the basic methods to remove the PFIC taint).
43. See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 8621 (Rev. December 2013) 4 (2013) [hereinafter FORM 8621
INSTRUCTIONS] (stating retroactive elections can only occur under two limited
circumstances); Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.C (exploring when a retroactive election
can be made).
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B. The Three PFIC Regimes:
A PFIC asset can be categorized under one of the three
PFIC regimes depending on if the investor made an election
and the characteristics of the asset. Part I.B.1 focuses on the
excess distribution regime, next Part I.B.2 explores the QEF
regime and lastly, Part I.B.3 discusses the MTM regime.
1. Excess Distribution Regime
If a US taxpayer owns stock of a PFIC and makes no
election, such individual will be subject to the § 1291 excess
distribution rules.44 An “excessive distribution” is defined as the
portion of any distribution that exceeds 125% of the average
PFIC distribution over the past three years or if less than three
years then based on the prior years.45 The “non-excess” portion
of distributions are taxed under the general US tax rules.46
Additionally, all gains recognized from the disposition of a PFIC
share are subject to the excess distribution taxation scheme.47
All excess distributions are allocated ratably to each day in
the taxpayer’s holding period for the stock after December 31,
1986.48 The amount allocated to the pre-PFIC period and the
current year are included in the shareholder’s ordinary income,
taxable at the prevailing ordinary income tax rate without any
penalty charges.49 For the remainder of the periods, however,
PFIC investors incur a penalty for the deferred tax amount and
are charged interest compounded daily, calculated in
accordance with the tax underpayment rate for each year under
§ 6621.50 Collectively, the excess distributions and interest are

44. See 26 U.S.C. § 1291(b) (2012) (outlining the excess distribution regime).
45. See § 1291(b)(2)(B) (clarifying what is included in the excess distribution
calculation).
46. See § 1291(a)(2) (emphasizing only excess distributions are subject to this
rule); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 10 (applying the statute to non-excess distributions).
47. See § 1291(a)(2) (informing taxpayers that all sales of PFIC assets are subject
to the excess distribution treatment).
48. § 1291(a)(1) (explaining how excess distributions are allocated to the
taxpayers holding period).
49. § 1291(a)(1)(B) (describing the PFIC treatment for the pre-PFIC period and
current year).
50. § 1291(c) (highlighting the PFIC calculations for prior PFIC years); 26 U.S.C.
§ 6621 (explaining the interest for tax underpayment).
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referred to as the deferred tax amount.51 Rather than being
taxed at more favorable rates determined by the character of the
income, the deferred income is across the board taxed as
ordinary income at the highest marginal tax rate for such year.52
Only a foreign tax credit can be used to offset the tax.53 New
regulations were proposed on April 1, 1992, but they have not
been finalized.54
2. The QEF Election
A shareholder can entirely avoid the excess distribution
regime by making a QEF election.55 Instead of waiting until the
PFIC makes a distribution, the QEF election allows the
shareholder to currently be taxed on the PFIC’s ordinary
earnings and net capital gains.56
The QEF election must be made by the US shareholder,
rather than by the PFIC.57 Shareholders must file Form 8621
with their federal income tax return indicating this election.58
The election for a taxable year must be made prior to the filing
deadline for tax returns in that taxable year.59 If such deadline is
not met, a retroactive election is permitted under (1) the
protective regime, where the investor preserves the right to
make a retroactive election, or (2) the consent regime when the
51. See § 1291(c) (outlining what the PFIC deferred tax is); Blanchard, supra note
20, at V.A (exploring the application of the excess distribution rules).
52. § 1291(a)(1)(B) (describing specifically how the PFIC is taxed under this
section); see Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.A (describing the taxation scheme in the
excess distribution regime).
53. See § 1291(g) (analyzing the operation of the PFIC tax credits); Blanchard,
supra note 20, at V.A (focusing on the available tax credits under the excess distribution
rules).
54. See Treatment of Shareholders of Certain Passive Foreign Investment
Companies, 57 Fed. Reg. 11024 (proposed Apr. 1, 1992) (proposing amendments to
the current PFIC rules); Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.A (stating new regulations have
been proposed but not yet adopted to clarify the excess distribution rules).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 1295(b)(1) (2012) (overviewing the QEF regime).
56. Id. (describing how an investor makes a QEF election); see FORM 8621
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 2 (explaining the operation of the QEF regime).
57. § 1295(b)(1) (articulating who makes the QEF election); Blanchard, supra
note 20, at VI.B (stating who and how to make a QEF election).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.1295-3(f)(1) (2013) (explaining the PFIC filing requirements);
see Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.D (finding Form 8621 must be filed to make the
election). See generally FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 1 (instructing how to
fill out Form 8621).
59. § 1295(b)(2) (stating how to make the QEF election).
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investor does not qualify under the protective regime, the
investor can request that the IRS permit a retroactive election.60
In order to make a QEF election, the PFIC must provide a
shareholder with sufficient information to determine the
ordinary earnings and net capital gain of such company.61 The
PFIC must release an Annual Information Statement that
indicates the investor’s pro rata share of ordinary earnings and
net capital gains for the taxable year, sufficient information for
the shareholder to make the calculation, or a statement that the
PFIC allowed the shareholder to inspect documents necessary to
make the calculation.62 The PFIC annual statement also needs to
include the value of distributions or deemed distributions to the
shareholder during the taxable year.63 The PFIC must release a
statement declaring shareholders can inspect necessary
documents to ensure the PFIC’s ordinary earnings and capital
gains were computed in compliance with the IRS rules, or
documentation that the IRS has already approved of the
calculations.64
Once the QEF election is made, it applies to all subsequent
years unless the international corporation is no longer
considered a PFIC or the shareholder revokes the election.65
Nevertheless, to maintain the QEF election the PFIC
60. See FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 4 (categorizing the two ways to
make a retroactive QEF election); Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.C (suggesting a
possible way to make a retroactive election).
61. § 1295(a)(2) (stating the information required to make a QEF election).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.1295-1(g)(i)-(ii) (2013) (requiring the PFIC to provide
information related to the ordinary income and net capital gains of the PFIC so
investors have the necessary information for the QEF election); see FORM 8621
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 5 (highlighting that the PFIC statement must include
information about ordinary income and net capital gains in order for the investor to
make the QEF election).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.1295-1(g)(ii) (2013) (explaining the information necessary to
be included in the PFIC Annual Information Statement, including all distributions).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.1295-1(g)(iv)(A) (2013) (outlining the information needed to
make a QEF election); see FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 5 (describing
what needs to be included in the PFIC Annual Information Statement); Robert W.
Wood & Jonathan Van Loo, PFICs Are Here to Stay–And So Is FATCA, 2013 WOODCRAFT
TAX NOTES 805, 807-08 (May 13, 2013), available at http://www.woodllp.com/
Publications/Articles/pdf/PFICs.pdf (illustrating the information requirements to
make the PFIC election).
65. § 1295(b)(1) (stating the QEF status applies to all subsequent years); see
Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.A (explaining how the timing of the QEF elections
operates).
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shareholder must provide information to satisfy the annual
filing requirements.66
3. The MTM Election
As an alternative to the QEF election, the MTM election
can also be used to avoid the excess distribution regime and
assume current taxation.67 A PFIC investor can make the MTM
election under § 1296 if the PFIC asset is considered a
“marketable stock.”68 A “marketable stock” refers to any stock
that is regularly traded on a national securities exchange
registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) or a national market system established under Section
11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or any exchange or
market the Secretary deems fit.69 An investor must make the
election by the filing Form 8621 by the deadline for the taxable
year.70
Under the MTM election, a shareholder annually includes
in gross income the difference between the fair market value of
the PFIC stock at the close of the year and the adjusted basis,
which is essentially the annual gain on the asset as if it is sold at
the end of each year.71 If the adjusted basis of the PFIC exceeds
the fair market value of the PFIC, then the taxpayer is allowed a
deduction for the lesser of the excess or the “unreversed
inclusions” of the stock.72 “Unreversed inclusions” refer to the
excess of the taxpayer’s MTM gains for prior taxable years over
66. See FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 4 (describing what a PFIC
investor must do annually); Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.D (articulating
requirements for a PFIC investor to maintain the QEF election annually).
67. See FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 4 (describing what a PFIC
investor must do annually under the MTM election); Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at
42–43 (2011) (detailing the MTM regime requirements).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 1296(a) (stating that an MTM election can only be made when the
asset is a “marketable stock”).
69. § 1296(e)(1) (defining what a “marketable stock” includes); see Lee & Smiley,
supra note 22, at 42–43 (exploring the MTM regime and its requirements).
70. § 1296(a) (instructing how to make the MTM tax calculation); see FORM 8621
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 5 (Rev. December 2012) (describing the necessary
calculations under the MTM election).
71. § 1296(a)(1) (explaining how to determine the tax consequences under the
MTM regime).
72. § 1296(a)(2) (specifying when deductions are permitted under the MTM
election); see Blanchard, supra note 20, at IX.D (explaining taxation under the MTM
regime).
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the taxpayer’s MTM loss for prior taxable years.73 The PFIC
adjusted basis is increased by the amount included in gross
income for past years and decreased by the amount allowed for
deductions.74 Under all circumstances, gains, dispositions, or
other distributions from the PFIC under the MTM election are
taxed as ordinary income.75
C. The Foreign Tax Credit
The United States-Canada Income Tax Convention (the
“Treaty”) is designed to prevent individuals from being subject
to taxation on the same income in both Canada and the United
States.76 To prevent double taxation, a foreign tax credit is
available under certain circumstances.77 If a taxpayer owes taxes
outside of the United States on non-US source income and is
also subject to US taxes on the same income, such taxpayer may
be entitled to take a credit for the amount of the foreign taxes
accrued to reduce the US taxes owed.78 Essentially a foreign tax
credit can reduce the US tax liability by the amount already paid
or accrued in non-US taxes.79 A taxpayer is eligible to take a

73. § 1296(d) (defining “unreversed inclusions”); see Blanchard, supra note 20, at
IX.D (exploring how losses are treated under the MTM regime).
74. § 1296(b)(1) (detailing how to calculate the adjusted basis).
75. § 1296(c)(1) (guiding investors on how to calculate the applicable taxes under
the MTM regime).
76. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
FOR INDIVIDUALS, PUBLICATION 514, at 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter IRS, Foreign Tax
Credit] (finding US citizens are taxed on worldwide income and normally entitled to a
credit for any foreign taxes paid or accrued). See generally Convention Between The
United States of America and Canada with respect to Income and Capital, U.S.-Can.,
September 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087 (highlighting how one purpose of the treaty
was to prevent double taxation of income).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2012) (permitting a taxpayer to claim a foreign tax credit
against US taxes accrued); see DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1116, at 1 (2013) [hereinafter FORM 1116 INSTRUCTIONS]
(enabling taxpayers to claim a foreign tax credit after filing this form).
78. See IRS, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 76 (stating a foreign tax credit is
available in the same year an investors pays a qualified foreign tax). See generally FORM
1116 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 77, and accompanying text (highlighting when
taxpayers can take a foreign tax credit).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 904(a) (2012) (explaining how the foreign tax credit is limited);
see IRS, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 76 (summarizing how the foreign tax credit
works and how it is limited by the extent of US taxes accrued in that year).
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foreign tax credit by filing Form 1116 for qualifying foreign
income.80
The foreign tax credit is always limited by the US taxes
incurred multiplied by a fraction.81 The numerator of the
fraction is an individual’s taxable income from sources outside
the United States and the denominator is such individual’s total
taxable income from the US and foreign source income
(worldwide income).82 In determining the limit on the US
foreign tax credit, a taxpayer must separate the different sources
of foreign income and then determine the limit for each source
independently.83
If the foreign tax credit available exceeds the limit, a
taxpayer can carryback and carryover unused foreign tax credit
outlined under § 904(c).84 A taxpayer is allowed to carryback
unused foreign tax credit one year and then carryover unused
foreign tax credit ten years.85
D. Filing and Compliance Requirements
All PFIC investors are required to file Form 8621, called the
“Information Return by a Shareholder of a Passive Foreign
Investment Company or Qualified Election Fund,” annually, if
the investor receives a distribution, recognizes a gain on a

80. FORM 1116 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 77, and accompanying text (instructing
a taxpayer to file Form 1116 to receive a foreign tax credit on income that qualifies
under § 901 and § 904).
81. § 904(a) (articulating the limitation of the foreign tax credit); see IRS, Foreign
Tax Credit, supra note 76, at 11 (emphasizing that the foreign tax credit is limited by a
fraction of US income).
82. § 904(a) (outlining the extent of a foreign tax credit a taxpayer can annually
utilize); see IRS, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 76 (detailing how to calculate the
allowable foreign tax credit for the year).
83. § 904(d) (requiring taxpayers to separately apply the foreign tax credit rules
to each type of income); see also IRS, Foreign Tax Credit, supra note 76 (instructing
taxpayers to separate the different sources of income to determine the foreign tax
credit available for each type of income).
84. § 904(c) (stating how to utilize unused foreign tax credits); see IRS, Foreign
Tax Credit, supra note 76 (highlighting what taxpayers can do with unused foreign tax
credits that exceed the limit for the year).
85. § 904(c) (detailing how the carryback and carryover of the unused portion of
the foreign tax credit operates).
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disposition, or makes an election.86 Depending on what the
taxpayer is attempting to do, there are different filing deadlines
and reporting requirements as discussed above under the
different regimes.87
The class of investors required to file Form 8621, and any
other filing requirements the Secretary may require, was
expanded to include “each United States person who is a
shareholder of a [PFIC]” under § 1298(f).88 Thus, regardless if
there is a distribution, disposition, or inclusion, a PFIC investor
must comply with the filing requirements.89 This change only
impacts PFIC reporting for taxable years starting after December
30, 2013.90 While technically this change was effective as of
March 2010, not until December 30, 2013, did the IRS issue final
and temporary regulations actually implementing the § 1298(f)
requirements.91 Nevertheless, the new regulations provide
certain exceptions when there is a chain of ownership to
minimize duplicate reporting, while still ensuring sufficient
information is reported to ensure compliance with the PFIC
regime.92 The December 30, 2013 regulations also provided
several other exceptions.93

86. FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 1 (stating when individuals must
file Form 8621); Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (explaining that all PFIC investors
must file Form 8621).
87. See generally FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43 (overviewing the
different regimes and the respective requirements); supra Part 1.B (describing the
three different PFIC regimes).
88. 26 U.S.C. § 1298(f) (2012) (indicating who must comply with the PFIC filing
requirements); see Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (stating the new regulations do not
apply to PFIC owners in previous years).
89. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, IRS issues Regulations Regarding Ownership
and Information for Passive Foreign Investment Companies 3 (January 7, 2014),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication/ff172417-32ae-4146-9ebf-8ec01b731fc4/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c579a44c-fc39-4144-850c-948da65c0aa6/SC_
Publication_IRS_Issues_Regulations_Regarding_Ownership_and_Information_
Reporting.pdf (emphasizing that all PFIC investors must file annually irrespective of
the PFIC activity).
90. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (stating the new regulations do not
retroactively apply); Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 89 (highlighting the fact that
the December 30, 2013, rules only affect PFIC owners going forward).
91. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (explaining the progression of
implementing the § 1298(f) requirements). See generally Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
supra note 89 (summarizing the changes from March 2010 through December 2013).
92. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (describing the objective of
implementing changes to the PFIC requirements to reduce duplicate filing). See
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E. PFIC Spotlight: The Canadian Mutual Fund
Canadian mutual funds are categorized by the IRS as PFICs,
and, thus, are subject to the tax and compliance complications
of the PFIC regime.94 Because shares of mutual funds are
marketable securities, investors may be able to make the MTM
election.95
Industry specialists believe non-US mutual funds from
countries with a similar taxation and regulatory framework as
the United States should not be subject to the PFIC rules.96 This
is especially applicable to Canada—a country that has strong,
long standing ties with the United States and is far from being
characterized as a tax haven.97 The Canada Revenue Agency
(“CRA”) has vowed to increase its efforts to curtail tax evasion
by Canadian citizens in other countries—striving to punish not
only the individuals but also the institutions facilitating tax
evasion.98 Hence, tax evasion is certainly neither behavior the
Canadians endorse nor facilitate.99
generally Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 89, at 5–6 (emphasizing the rationale for
the PFIC exceptions found in the new regulations).
93. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at XI.B (outlining two additional exceptions to
the PFICs expanded class of investors required to file annual reports). See generally
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 89, at 6–7 (noting additional exceptions in the
regulations when PFIC investors do not need to comply with the filing requirements).
94. See Golombek, supra note 4 (referring to the Canadian mutual fund as a
PFIC); Mezzetta, supra note 4 (arguing Canadian mutual funds should no longer be
considered a PFIC).
95. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text (explaining what assets qualify
for the MTM election).
96. See Golombek, supra note 4 (challenging categorizing Canadian mutual funds
as PFICs); IFIC Letter, supra note 5 (highlighting the close relationship between
Canada and the United States, including the treaty).
97. See Golombek, supra note 4 (reasoning Canadian mutual funds should be
exempt from the PFIC rules); IFIC Letter, supra note 5 (emphasizing Canadian mutual
funds should not fall under the PFIC regime because Canada is not a tax haven).
98. See Dean Beeby, Wealthy Canadians Own Up to Offshore Tax Havens, GLOBAL
NEWS (Apr. 14, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://globalnews.ca/news/479230/wealthycanadians-own-up-to-offshore-tax-havens/ (explaining efforts by the Canadian Revenue
Agency to curtail tax evasion); John Greenwood, Canada’s Revenue Agency Struggling to
Keep Up with Rise in Tax-Haven Cases, AG Report Says, FINANCIAL POST (Toronto) (Nov.
26, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2013/11/26/auditor-generalliechtenstein-bank-affair-reveals-how-cra-not-ready-for-rising-tax-haven-cases/
(discussing the Canadian Revenue Agency increasing efforts to curtail and penalize tax
evasion).
99. Greenwood, supra note 98 (emphasizing how the Canadian are actively trying
to stop tax evasion).
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Much like the United States, Canada has strong regulatory
oversight.100 Canadian regulators have certain reporting
requirements, transparency rules, methods to file and
investigate financial institutions, and other means to monitor
the financial sector in an effort to prevent fraud, tax evasion,
and other illegal activity.101
Annually, Canadian mutual funds distribute all income and
gains to investors thereby subjecting investors to current
taxation in Canada, rather than the mutual fund deferring
distributions and, thus, deferring taxation.102 In Canada,
investors are subject to current taxation on money actually
earned, irrespective if the earnings are cashed in or
reinvested.103 Distributed income maintains its character, and,
thus, earnings (interest, dividends, and capital gains) are all
taxed at the appropriate variable tax rates.104 For example,
dividend income at the mutual fund level remains dividend
income at the investor level for Canadian tax purposes.105
To calculate an investor’s capital gain or loss, the investor
must subtract the total of the adjusted cost basis (“ACB”) and
any other expenses or outlays incurred in selling the shares,

100. See generally CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 1
(explaining regulation of the Canadian markets and mutual fund treatment in
Canada); CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (outlining how mutual fund
investors are protected).
101. See generally CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 1
(describing the Canadian mutual fund treatment and market in Canada); CSA ON
MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 6 (educating investors on how Canadian mutual fund
investments are protected).
102. See CSA ON MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining how investors
make money from a Canadian mutual fund); Mezzetta, supra note 4 (highlighting the
problem with the PFIC regime for Canadian mutual funds).
103. CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 1 (articulating how
Canadian mutual fund distributions are taxed). See generally RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT.,
TAXES
AND
INVESTING
IN
MUTUAL
FUNDS
(2013),
available
at
http://funds.rbcgam.com/_assets-custom/pdf/taxes-and-investing-in-mutual-funds.pdf
(describing how Canadian mutual funds distribute income and how they are taxed)..
104. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., supra note 103, at 5–10 (explaining how
income distributions maintain their character for tax purposes); CSA ON MUTUAL
FUNDS, supra note 2, at 5; CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 1
(describing taxation of mutual funds).
105. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., supra note 103, at 5–10 (providing how
Canadian mutual fund distributions are taxed); CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
supra note 2, at 1 (exploring the taxation scheme of Canadian mutual funds).
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from the proceeds of the disposition.106 The ACB is calculated as
the average cost of all shares multiplied by the number of
shares.107 The proceeds of disposition are calculated as the total
number of shares multiplied by the share per unit price.108
In sum, Part I highlighted how the PFIC regime was
originally promulgated to prevent tax evasion and deferral.109
The PFIC regime, however, is extremely legalistic and
burdensome for US taxpayers invested in non-US passive
assets.110 The Excess Distribution, QEF, and MTM regimes all
have their own set of tax rules and corresponding challenges.111
This Comment specifically focuses on US taxpayers invested in
the Canadian mutual fund PFIC.
II. PFIC PROBLEMS
The PFIC framework does not operate exactly as the
legislators intended. In fact, in many instances the PFIC rules
create inconsistent results. Part II.A discusses the harsh penalties
and compliance complications under the excess distribution
regime. While the QEF and MTM regimes were created to
ameliorate the effects of the excess distribution regimes, they
are criticized as less than ideal solutions. Part II.B explains how
the QEF regime is ineffective because investors are rarely able to
satisfy the information burden to make the election and
accordingly, receive the more favorable treatment. Part II.C
discusses how the MTM election also has limited utility and
generates its own problems for investors. Next, Part II.D
106. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., supra note 103, at 4 (instructing how to make
the ACB calculation); CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (clarifying
how mutual funds are taxed, including the ACB calculation).
107. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., supra note 103, at 4 (describing the ACB
calculation); CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (describing
taxation of mutual funds).
108. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MGMT., supra note 103, at 4 (explaining what are
considered to be the actual gains of the mutual fund); CRA TREATMENT OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, supra note 2, at 2 (highlighting the steps to calculate the mutual funds’ capital
gain).
109. See supra notes 24–43 and accompanying text (noting reasons for enacting
the PFIC legislation).
110. See supra Part I (outlining the many challenges for investors in the PFIC
regime).
111. See supra notes 44–75 and accompanying text (illuminating the three
different PFIC regimes and applicable tax treatment).
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addresses additional issues with the PFIC regime, including the
compliance costs, PFIC rules no longer promoting the legislative
intentions, FATCA initiation, and PFIC rules favoring individual
assets over pooled vehicles. Part II.E lastly outlines the
complications of subjecting a Canadian mutual fund to this
regime.
A. The Unintended Results of the Excess Distribution Rules
Commentators suggest that the PFIC excess distribution
rules cast far too wide a net, beyond the regulators’ original
intent of preventing tax deferral.112 Instead of simply leveling
the playing field between US and international passive
investments, the rules penalize US investors in international
passive assets.113 Under the excess distribution regime, all gains
are treated as ordinary income without regard to the character
of the income; excess distributions are allocated to prior years,
taxed at the highest ordinary income tax rate per year, and
charged a penalty for underpayment on the deferred tax.114
Whether no actual distribution or disposition is made, or all
income is distributed, investors are subject to the excess
distribution taxes.115 Furthermore, it is important to note that
the deferred tax amount is treated similarly to a tax penalty that
can only be offset by a foreign tax credit, and not losses.116
Investor Keith is a prime example of taxation under the
default rules. To recap, Keith, a US taxpayer purchased the PFIC
Canadian mutual fund on January 1, 1993, for US$1000 and
then sold it on December 31, 2012, for US$21,000.117 Since
112. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.A (highlighting the excess distribution
regime, including its deficiencies); Mezzetta, supra note 4 (outlining the problem with
the PFIC regime for Canadian mutual funds).
113. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at II.E (explaining the tax deferral policy and
accompanying issues under this regime); Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (critiquing
the excess distribution regime).
114. See supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text (discussing the PFIC regime
default rules).
115. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at II.E (exploring the excess distribution
taxation); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 10 (summarizing the excess distribution regime).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 1291(g) (2012) (stating the special tax credits available under
this default regime); Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.A (describing how the deferred tax
amount can only be offset by a foreign tax credit).
117. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 13 (providing an example to show the harsh
taxes under the excess distribution regime).
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Keith made no election (and was in fact unaware he owned a
PFIC), he would be subject to the excess distribution tax which
is almost equal to the income he earned. Keith incurred a total
US tax payment of US$19,415.53 on income of US$20,000.118
This is assuming a tax rate of 39.6% and an interest charge for
underpayment of four percent compounded daily.119

118. See id. (showing that taxes can be close or even greater than profits under the
excess distribution regime). See generally Part I.B.1 (consequences of the excess
distribution regime if no election is made).
119. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 13 (exemplifying how profits are reduced by
the tax rate and interest for underpayment). See generally Part I.B.1 (describing what
factors are used in calculating taxes for the excess distribution regime).
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Total
Allocable
Interest
payment
part of the Tax (US$)
(US$)
gain (US$)
(US$)
1993
1,000.00
396.00
846.72
1,242.72
1994
1,000.00
396.00
813.52
1,209.52
1995
1,000.00
396.00
781.63
1,177.63
1996
1,000.00
396.00
750.98
1,146.98
1997
1,000.00
396.00
721.54
1,117.54
1998
1,000.00
396.00
693.25
1,089.25
1999
1,000.00
396.00
666.06
1,062.06
2000
1,000.00
396.00
639.95
1,035.95
2001
1,000.00
396.00
614.86
1,010.86
2002
1,000.00
396.00
590.75
986.75
2003
1,000.00
396.00
567.59
963.59
2004
1,000.00
396.00
545.33
941.33
2005
1,000.00
396.00
523.95
919.95
2006
1,000.00
396.00
503.41
899.41
2007
1,000.00
396.00
483.67
879.67
2008
1,000.00
396.00
464.71
860.71
2009
1,000.00
396.00
446.49
842.49
2010
1,000.00
396.00
428.98
824.98
2011
1,000.00
396.00
412.16
808.16
2012
1,000.00
396.00
0.00
396.00
Total $20,000.00
$7,920.00
$11,495.53
$19,415.53
Source: Calculations Based on the New York City Bar Report.120
Year

As the table suggests, this regime can result in taxation
almost equal to the actual PFIC income earned, and in some
instances taxation even greater than income earned.121 These
120. N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7.
121. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 11–13 (exemplifying the excess distribution
regime). See generally Blanchard, supra note 20, at V (noting the severe tax penalties
under the excess distribution regime).
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scenarios often result when the PFIC is held over a long period
of time and there are large excess distributions.122
B. False Hope for Redemption in the QEF Election
In theory, the QEF election was designed to entirely avoid
the § 1291 excess distribution regime and to treat the PFIC as a
US asset without the higher ordinary tax rates or penalty
charges.123 In practice, critics argue that the two prerequisite
steps to make the election, discussed below, are far too
burdensome.124 These steps often deny investors the opportunity
to make the election.125
First, the shareholder must make a timely election to
completely avoid the PFIC excess distribution regime.126 If the
QEF election is made in the first PFIC year, the asset becomes a
pedigreed PFIC, and then the investor can entirely avoid the
excess distribution regime under § 1298(b)(1).127 In contrast, if
a retroactive QEF election is made later, the PFIC is subject to
both the § 1291 excess distribution and QEF rules.128 The
§ 1298(b)(1) “once a PFIC, always a PFIC” rule applies to PFICs
that are not pedigreed PFICs.129Retroactive elections are only
122. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 11–13 (illustrating the harsh consequences
that can result under the excessive distribution regime).
123. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
QEF election).
124. See FORM 8621 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 43, at 1 (instructing investors on
how to make the QEF election); Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.A (describing the
necessary steps to make a QEF election).
125. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.B (warning the deadlines and information
burden can prevent investors from making the election); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at
15–16 (hinting at the challenges of making the QEF election, namely the corporation
agreeing to provide the necessary information).
126. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.A (explaining how to make a timely QEF
election); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 16 (stating when the election must be made to be
considered timely).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 1298(b)(1) (2012) (exploring the impact of the time an investor
makes a QEF election); Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-1(b) (2013) (describing the pedigreed
PFIC); see N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 15–16 (defining when a PFIC is a pedigreed
PFIC).
128. See N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 15–16 (defining when a PFIC is not pedigreed
and subject to the PFIC taint); Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.F (explaining treatment
of pedigreed PFICs).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.1295-1(c)(2) (2013) (describing the PFIC taint); see N.Y.C.
BAR, supra note 7, at 16 (defining the QEF regime based on the time the QEF election
is made).
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permissible under limited circumstances.130 Hence, if investors
simply do not realize they are subject to the PFIC regime, miss
the deadline to make a timely election, and are denied the
opportunity to make a retroactive election, such investors forfeit
the more favorable tax rates under the QEF regime.131
Second, the shareholder must obtain the necessary
information from the PFIC to make the QEF election.132 This
can be difficult information to acquire because the United
States uses the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”) accounting system and all other countries use the
International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”).133
Accordingly, a Canadian PFIC would be required to keep
separate books applying all of the US tax rules and PFIC
regulations in order to provide investors with the necessary
information.134 This information must be produced annually or
the QEF status terminates.135 In addition to converting the
records to comply with US accounting principles, the PFIC must
agree to take on the liability of accurately reporting in order to
make the election.136 Thus, scholars argue that the PFIC
information requirements place an undue burden on PFICs

130. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
QEF election).
131. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.C (explaining when the election is to be
made); Wood & Van Loo, supra note 64, at 808 (exploring the consequences of missing
the election filing deadline).
132. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (overviewing the QEF regime).
133. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VII.A (instructing how to make the necessary
calculations for QEF election); Remi Forgeas, Is IFIRS That Different from U.S. GAAP?,
IFRS RESOURCES (June 16, 2008), http://www.ifrs.com/overview/General/differences
.html (differentiating between the US GAAP system and IFRS).
134. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (articulating the steps PFICs must take to
comply with the election requirements); Wood & Van Loo, supra note 64, at 808
(describing the steps for a PFIC to meet the QEF filing requirements).
135. See FORM 8621 Instructions, supra note 43, at 4 (instructing what information
the PFIC must provide annually); Scott F. Usher & Diana L. Pitner, QEF Elections Under
PFIC Rules, AICPA (October 1, 2012), http://www.aicpa.org/publications/taxadviser/
2012/october/pages/clinic-story-07.aspx (summarizing the QEF regime and method to
make the election).
136. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.D (emphasizing the burden placed on the
PFIC in order for investors to make the QEF election).
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whose only connection to the United States may be through a
minority investor.137
In sum, the QEF election imposes a heavy burden on US
taxpayers and PFICs.138 Without the cooperation of the PFIC,
investors are unable to make the election.139 Hence, in many
instances, investors are denied the benefits of the QEF election.
C. The Next Best Option—the MTM Election
Since the QEF election can rarely be made, the next best
option to escape the excess distribution regime is the MTM
election.140 The MTM election was also designed to ameliorate
the punitive effects of the excess distribution regime.141 Many
criticize the MTM’s limited utility because it only applies to a
small subset of PFICs considered to be marketable securities.142
Additionally, the MTM election can only be made when an
investor directly holds the PFIC or holds it through a passthrough entity under § 1296(g).143 Even when such election can
in fact be made, the investor is still subject to ordinary income
tax rates on all appreciation in value of the PFIC rather than the
more favorable capital gains tax rate that applies under the QEF
election.144 Hence, investors in Canadian mutual funds reap only

137. Id. (highlighting the imposition the QEF requirements place on the PFIC
itself in order for an investor to comply with the QEF rules); Wood & Van Loo, supra
note 64, at 808 (describing the challenges involved in making the QEF election).
138. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.D (detailing how an investor can make the
QEF election); IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (exploring difficulties investors encounter
in making the QEF election).
139. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at VI.D (explaining the requirements to make
the QEF election); Usher & Pitner, supra note 135 (summarizing issues encountered
with the QEF regime).
140. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (discussing how the MTM regime is an
alternative to the excess distribution regime); Wood & Van Loo, supra note 64, at 805
(exploring the MTM and QEF elections).
141. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at IX.A (outlining the mark-to-market regime);
Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (critiquing the PFIC regime).
142. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at IX.A (outlining when the MTM regime can
be used); Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (exploring the limited utility of the MTM
regime).
143. 26 U.S.C. § 1296(g) (2012) (describing who can make the MTM election); see
Blanchard, supra note 20, at IX.A (detailing the requirements to make the MTM
election).
144. 1296(c) (explaining how the PFIC is taxed under the MTM regime); see
N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 18 (highlighting the MTM tax rules).
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partial benefits by making the MTM election because such
investors are still subject to ordinary income taxes on the mutual
funds appreciation.145
D. PFIC Problems Plaguing All Three Regimes
Regardless of the regime the PFIC is categorized under,
there are many inherent problems with the PFIC regulations.
Part II.D.1 first discusses the high compliance costs. Part II.D.2
next explains that the legislative purpose for enacting the
regulation does not apply to Canadian mutual funds. Part II.D.3
then demonstrates that the PFIC regime discourages investment
in pooled vehicles by not subjecting individual assets to the same
rigorous treatment. Lastly, Part II.D.4 explores the impact of the
imminent Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”)
initiation.
1. Outrageous Compliance Costs
Requiring a PFIC owner to file Form 8621 is very time
consuming and burdensome, even for US tax specialists.146 The
form instructions indicate that the estimated time to properly
comply with the PFIC filing requirements is over thirty-one
hours per PFIC.147 It is nearly impossible for the average PFIC
investor to complete the form without incurring the added cost
of consulting tax experts.148
Form 8621 also requires detailed information about the
PFIC, which is not always accessible to a minority investor and
can be a significant burden on the PFIC to produce.149 Another
145. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 42–43 (describing the MTM regime as less
preferable than the QEF regime because there is still ordinary income on all
appreciation in value of the PFIC). See generally Blanchard, supra note 20, at IX
(outlining the MTM tax treatment, which is not as favorable as the QEF treatment).
146. See FORM 8621 Instructions, supra note 43, at 12 (outlining the requirements
to file this form); Golombek, supra note 4 (critiquing the compliance costs of the PFIC
regulations for US investors in Canada).
147. See FORM 8621 Instructions, supra note 43, at 12 (estimating the time
required to file this form); Golombek, supra note 4 (criticizing how long it takes to file
Form 8621 required to comply with the PFIC regulations).
148. See Golombek, supra note 4 (stating PFIC investors generally require
professional assistance to file the PFIC forms).
149. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the information a PFIC must provide for
an investor to make an election under Form 8621).
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obstacle to complying with the PFIC regime is that many
investors are simply ignorant of the fact that they are PFIC
investors and subject to certain reporting guidelines.150
Investors, who are unaware of the PFIC classification of their
investments, do not comply with the strict election and filing
deadlines, and hence suffer severe financial consequences.151
2. Application of the PFIC Regime to Canadian Mutual Funds
The PFIC regulations were promulgated to eliminate the
tax incentives of investing in passive assets outside of the United
States.152 Overtime, tax rates for different sources of income
have fluctuated.153 Today, Canadian mutual funds do not
provide the same tax advantages for US taxpayers that the PFIC
regulations were initially promulgated to eliminate.154 When the
rules were promulgated in 1986, the qualified dividend tax rate
and long-term capital gains tax rate were different.155 PFIC
dividends were not considered derived from a “qualified foreign
corporation.”156 Thus, the rules required PFIC dividends to be

150. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.C (investors often miss PFIC issues and
such investors are not able to make a retroactive elections). See generally supra notes 44–
75 and accompanying text (noting the problems encountered by PFIC investors who do
not realize they own a PFIC until too late).
150. 26 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2012) (stating what information is required to make
a QEF election).
151. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at V.C (identifying issues when investors fail to
meet the filing deadlines); Wood & Van Loo, supra note 64, at 808 (exploring the
consequences of missing the election filing deadline); supra Part II.B (focusing on
consequences for investors ignorant that they own a PFIC and then do not comply with
the requirements).
152. See supra notes 24–43 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
history for enacting the PFIC rules).
153. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (explaining how tax rates for capital
gains and income have fluctuated and are now equal); see also A taxpayer’s Guide to 2013,
FIDELITY (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/personal-finance/
taxpayers-guide (stating the qualified dividend tax rate is the long-term capital gains
rate for both 2012 and 2013).
154. See supra notes 24–43 and accompanying text (noting the tax reasons for
enacting the PFIC rules).
155. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT, supra note 19, at 1023
(explaining the relevant tax rates when the PFIC rules were promulgated); see also Lee
& Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (describing the tax regime when the PFIC rules were
enacted).
156. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11)(C)(iii) (2012) (defining the “qualified foreign
corporation”).
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taxed at the highest ordinary income tax rate.157 By subjecting
PFIC dividends to the highest ordinary income tax rate,
legislators eliminated the tax advantages of investing through an
international investment company.158 Today, tax rates are equal,
so the tax advantage of converting foreign dividends to capital
gains no longer exists.159 Thus, investors are now penalized for
utilizing an investment vehicle that has no inherent tax
advantage.160
More specifically, the PFIC rules cast far too wide a net by
encompassing Canadian mutual funds.161 First, as the Investment
Funds Institute of Canada (“IFIC”) indicates, Canada is not a
tax haven, has a long history with the United States, including a
tax treaty, and, thus, should not be the target of US
regulation.162 Second, US investors do not utilize the Canadian
mutual fund class to defer or evade US taxes, nor to gain other
unfair advantages that the PFIC regulations seek to curtail.163
Under the current PFIC framework, Canadian and US
mutual funds are subject to an entirely different tax and
157. See Blanchard, supra note 20, at II.G (explaining the applicable dividend rate
for PFICs); Wood & Van Loo, supra note 64, at 807 (stating the tax rates that apply to
PFICs).
158. See EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT, supra note 19, at 1023
(describing how the PFIC rules increased the tax rate for non-US passive investments,
thereby eliminating the tax incentives); Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (explaining
how the PFIC rules eliminated the tax incentive to invest through non-US passive
assets).
159. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (finding the same tax advantages with
foreign investments no longer exist); see also EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT,
supra note 19, at 1023 (explaining the tax regime when the PFIC rules were
promulgated).
160. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (critiquing the PFIC regime for being
punitive); see also IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 3 (arguing investors are penalized for
investing in PFICs).
161. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 3 (challenging the PFIC regime application
to Canadian mutual funds); N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 7, at 1 (highlighting how the PFIC
rules are over-inclusive).
162. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (challenging the application of the PFIC
regime to Canadian mutual funds); Media Release, Investment Institute of Canada,
IFIC Proposes Excluding Canadian Funds from PFIC Rules (Apr. 16, 2013)
[hereinafter Summary of IFIC Proposal], available at https://www.ific.ca/en/news/
april-16-2013-ific-proposes-excluding-canadian-funds-from-pfic-rules/ (summarizing the
reasons why Canadian mutual funds should be exempt from the PFIC rules).
163. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing US taxpayers do not use
Canadian mutual funds for tax deferral). See generally supra Part I.E (outlining the
Canadian mutual fund vehicle and how it is regulated).
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compliance regime.164 However, the President and CEO of the
IFIC urges “[t]here is sufficient similarity between the tax
treatment of mutual funds in Canada and the US to support the
exclusion of Canadian mutual funds from the PFIC rules.”165
Canadian mutual funds are not structured as an “offshore tax
shelter”.166 In fact, the Canadian market and mutual fund
industry are highly regulated.167 Additionally, the structure of a
mutual fund, a pooled investment vehicle, mitigates the
potential for being utilized as an abusive tax vehicle because
individual investors lack control over the fund and regulators
require certain disclosures to investors to facilitate
transparency.168 Lastly, all income and gains are distributed
annually so the PFIC is not an abusive tax deferral vehicle.169
3. PFIC Regulations Favor Individual Assets Over Pooled
Investment Vehicles
An inherent problem with the PFIC rules is that they
encourage investment in individual securities rather than
pooled vehicles.170 For example, purchasing shares of an active
stock on the Canadian market would not be considered a PFIC,
but purchasing shares of a Canadian mutual fund that owns

164. See Lee & Smiley, supra note 22, at 43 (arguing the PFIC regime penalizes
investors for selecting non-US passive assets, rather than just leveling the playing field);
Golombek, supra note 4 (warning US investors to avoid Canadian mutual funds
because of the PFIC complications, which investors can entirely avoid by investing in
US mutual funds).
165. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (challenging the need to apply the PFIC
rules in Canada); supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text (highlighting the
Canadian mutual fund vehicle and similarities with the United States).
166. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing Canada is not tax haven and thus,
Canadian mutual funds cannot be utilized as a tax shelter); see also supra notes 21–22
and accompanying text (discussing how Canada is not a tax haven).
167. See generally supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text (outlining regulation
of the Canadian mutual fund market).
168. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing if would make sense for Canadian
mutual funds to be subject to the PFIC rules if investors had control over the assets).
169. Mezzetta, supra note 4 (highlighting how Canadian mutual funds distribute
income annually, so it cannot be utilized to avoid US taxation); see also CSA ON
MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 2, at 4 (describing how Canadian mutual funds distribute
income).
170. See IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing the PFIC regime favors individual
securities rather than pooled investment vehicles, like mutual funds); Summary of IFIC
Proposal, supra note 162 (critiquing the inequality that results from the PFIC rules).
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active companies would be considered a PFIC.171 The
Organization for Economic Co-Operation & Development
(“OECD”) believes an investment in a collective vehicle should
not result in different tax consequences than if the assets are
individually owned.172 Canadian mutual funds are among the
pooled assets OECD believes should be treated as equal to nonpooled assets because they are widely held assets, create a
diversified portfolio, and provide investor protection.173 So,
these rules can be viewed as discouraging US taxpayers from
investing in pooled securities and gaining the advantages of
such investments.174
4. Imminent FATCA Initiation
With the onset of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(“FATCA”) in 2014, Canadian financial services companies are
forced to disclose information on US taxpayers to the IRS.175
This forced disclosure program will likely expose US taxpayers
residing in Canada who have not been filing Form 8621 to
report PFIC holdings.176 Critics argue that when investors weigh
171. See supra Introduction (noting Keith could have avoided the PFIC regime by
selecting his own securities rather than purchasing shares of the mutual fund).
172. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, at 4 (2012) (suggesting that investing in individual
assets should not be encouraged over pooled investment vehicles); accord IFIC Letter,
supra note 5, at 2 (reinforcing OECD’s position that investment in pooled vehicles
should not create different tax results than investing in individual securities).
173. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text (articulating the benefits of the
mutual fund vehicle). But see Jason Heath, Mutual Funds: The Good, The Bad and The
Ugly, FIN. POST (February 12, 2013, 9:58 AM), http://business.financialpost.com/
2013/02/12/mutual-funds-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly (challenging the conception
that mutual funds are inherently good investments).
174. See Summary of IFIC PROPOSAL, supra note 162; IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 2
(challenging the PFIC regime in Canada).
175. See generally THUN FIN. ADVISORS, FATCA (FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX
COMPLIANCE ACT): WHAT AMERICAN INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW NOW (Jan. 2012),
http://www.thunfinancial.com/articles/US-FATCA-Foreign-Account-Tax-ComplianceWHAT
Act-Law-What-American-Expats-Need-to-Know.pdf
[hereinafter
FATCA:
AMERICAN INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW NOW] (outlining the implications of FATCA);
Marc D. Shepsman, Comment, Buying FATCA Compliance: Overcoming Holdout Incentives
to Prevent International Tax Arbitrage, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1769 (2013) (exploring the
potential consequences of the FATCA initiation for the United States).
176. See Terry F. Ritchie & James Sheldon, New Rules for US Taxpayers with Mutual
Funds, ADVISORS.CA (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.advisor.ca/tax/tax-news/new-rules-foru-s-taxpayers-in-canada-with-mutual-funds-141931 (stating FATCA will expose US
taxpayers not complying with the PFIC filing rules). See generally FATCA: WHAT
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the burden of the PFIC regime, including the hefty taxes and
cumbersome compliance costs, investors will opt to simply
dispose of their PFIC holdings.177
E. PFIC Spotlight: the Consequences for US Taxpayers Invested in
Mutual Funds
As discussed, the PFIC regime is over-inclusive because it
incorporates assets that are not utilized by investors to avoid or
defer current taxation.178 Mutual funds owned by US taxpayers
are a prime example of this problem.179
Assume that Investor A invests US$1000 in “PFIC mutual
fund” at the beginning of year 1 and holds the asset until the
end of year 4. Under the PFIC regime, A is eligible to make the
MTM election because a mutual fund is considered a
marketable security.180 Assuming A made this timely election, A
would be responsible for paying US taxes on the annual increase
in value of the PFIC determined at the end of each year as if the
asset was sold.181 The ordinary income tax rate would be applied
rather than the more favorable capital gains rate.182 A would also
be required to pay taxes on the actual distributions received
from the PFIC mutual fund at the ordinary income tax rate.183
For simplicity of this example, assume the PFIC mutual fund
that A is invested in does not make any annual distributions
during A’s four-year holding period.

AMERICAN INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW NOW, supra note 175 (exploring how FATCA will
increase the number of US taxpayers in Canada who are filing US tax returns); Wood &
Van Loo, supra note 64 (illustrating the implications of FATCA on the PFIC regime).
177. IFIC Letter, supra note 5, at 1–2 (arguing that FATCA may result in US
investors simply opting not to invest in PFICs, including Canadian mutual funds).
178. See supra note 152–169 and accompanying text (describing how the PFIC
regime incorporates assets that do not further the legislative intent for enacting the
rules).
179. See id. (focusing on how the PFIC regime should not incorporate the
Canadian mutual fund).
180. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing how an investor is
eligible to make an MTM election when the security is marketable).
181. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining how assets are taxed
under the MTM election).
182. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating the tax rate that applies to
a PFIC asset under the MTM regime).
183. See id.
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During this same period (years 1 through 3) A incurs no
non-US taxes because there are no actual distributions.184
Investors only incur non-US taxes on realized gains (actual
distribution), not on unrealized gains.185 For non-US tax
purposes, the first tax event in this example does not occur until
the end of year 4 when A sells the PFIC mutual fund holding.
In year 4, upon sale of all stock in the PFIC, A would incur
taxes in both the US and non-US country.186 For non-US tax
purposes, A must pay taxes on the total gain on the asset over
the entire holding period because none of the PFIC’s unrealized
gains have been taxed in prior years.187 This is calculated as the
redemption value (sale price) minus the adjusted cost base, in
this case the purchase price.188 For US tax purposes, A only has
to pay taxes on the increase in value of the asset over the past
year (year 3 to 4), the same manner A was taxed on the increase
in value of the asset in prior years.189
Since there are both US and non-US tax consequences in
year 4, A can use a foreign tax credit to offset the US taxes
owed.190 The non-US taxes are significantly higher than the US
taxes in year 4. A foreign tax credit can only be used to the
extent of US income in that year.191 Thus, a portion of the
foreign tax credit in year 4 cannot be used. The excess foreign
tax credit from year 4 can carryback one year to the extent of

184. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (stating Canada only taxes realized
gains).
185. See id. (finding investors are only taxed on actual distributions and not on
phantom income or increases in value of stock in Canada).
186. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (explaining the MTM taxation
scheme on the annual increase in value of the asset); supra notes 103-104 and
accompanying text (highlighting Canada only taxes assets on realized gains, which
includes disposition of an asset).
187. See supra notes 106–108 and accompanying text (discussing how Canada
taxes Canadian mutual funds and how Canadian capital gains are calculated).
188. See id.
189. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (noting that under the MTM
regime investors are subject to taxation on the increase in value annually, this includes
the year of disposition).
190. See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (emphasizing a foreign tax
credit is available when a US taxpayer is taxed on the same income in the US and nonUS country).
191. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (noting how the foreign tax
credit is limited).
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the US taxes owed in year 3.192 It should be noted that foreign
tax credits can only carryback one year and carryover ten
years.193 After the carryback, there is still a portion of foreign tax
credit remaining that is wasted because A has no future income
and A cannot carryback a foreign tax credit two years.
For purposes of this example, in year 4 A has US$310.50 in
non-US taxes, but A can only use the amount of US taxes
accrued in year 4, US$34.72, from the non-US taxes as a foreign
tax credit. Nevertheless, A can carryback US$203.98 to offset the
taxes in year 3. The remaining US$71.80 of foreign tax credit
cannot be used.
Due to this misalignment, Investor A is subject to double
taxation on a portion of the income earned. There is no foreign
tax credit available in years 1 through 3. The foreign tax credit
available in year 4 can be used to offset the income in year 4 and
then A can carryback the unused portion to offset taxes in year
3. There is no mechanism, however, to offset years 1 and 2 taxes
that are accrued in the respective years in the United States but
not until year 4 in the non-US country. Hence, A incurs
additional taxes due to the misalignment of tax events in the
United States and non-US country.
The table below shows the total non-US and US taxes after
accounting for the foreign tax credit.
The following assumptions were made:
 The US dollar and the non-US dollar are at par, so no
exchange rate calculations are necessary
 The non-US country only taxes distributed income
 This is investor A’s only foreign source income and A
has no future income
 US tax rates:
o Ordinary income, interest and short term tax rates
of 43.40%. This tax rate includes the highest
ordinary income tax rate of 39.6% and the Medicare
tax of 3.8%
o Long term capital gains tax rate of 23.80%
192. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (explaining the foreign tax
credit carryback provisions).
193. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (detailing how the foreign tax
credit carryback and carryover operates).
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 Non-US tax rates:
o Capital gains tax rate of 23%
0
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On the other hand, if investor A was not subject to the PFIC
regime, the taxes incurred would be significantly reduced.
There would be no US tax event in years 1 through 3. For US tax
purposes, the investor would only be taxed in year 4, upon
disposition of the asset, at the more favorable long-term capital
gains rate (23.80%). In both the United States and the non-US
country, the PFIC mutual fund would not be taxed until
disposition in year 4. Since all US and non-US taxes would be
incurred during the same year, the foreign tax credit could be
used against the total US tax consequence and significantly
reduce the taxes owed.194
Interestingly, the country in which this investor purchased
the mutual fund in was, in fact, Canada, just like investor Keith.
After considering the Canadian regulatory framework and the
mutual fund market, as well as Keith’s traumatic encounter with
the PFIC mutual fund, one must wonder why the Canadian
mutual fund remains categorized as a PFIC subject to the higher
tax rates exemplified in the table above and the added
compliance costs.
In sum, investors and experts are particularly critical of the
treatment of Canadian mutual funds under the PFIC regime.195
The QEF election is generally unavailable, the MTM election
offers little relief from the excess distribution regime, and
compliance costs remain high.196 Furthermore, subjecting
Canadian mutual funds to the PFIC regime does not further the
legitimate goals of the regime and instead, interferes with the
US investment in Canadian mutual funds.197

194. See generally notes 76–85 and accompanying text (explaining when and how
the foreign tax credit operates).
195. See supra notes 154–171 and accompanying text (highlighting the issues with
the PFIC regime, particularly with the Canadian mutual fund).
196. See supra notes 112–145 and accompanying text (arguing that none of the
PFIC regimes offer sufficient relief to Canadian mutual fund investors).
197. See supra notes 154–171 and accompanying text (supporting the argument
that the original legislative intent is no longer furthered by including Canadian mutual
funds in the PFIC rules).
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III. THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION OF CANADIAN MUTUAL
FUNDS FROM THE PFIC REGULATIONS
To resolve the current issues with the PFIC regulations, Part
III proposes exempting Canadian mutual funds from the PFIC
categorization. Part III.A outlines a proposal to tax Canadian
mutual funds under the ordinary US tax rules and the
corresponding rationale. Part III.B then discusses the benefits of
exempting Canadian mutual funds from the PFIC rules.
A. The Proposal
The United States-Canada Income Tax Convention (the
“Treaty”) should exempt Canadian mutual funds that meet the
PFIC asset or income test where the investor does not exert
control.198 This would include investors with less than fifty
percent of the voting rights of the PFIC, and thus, unable to
exert control. In doing so, US taxpayers would still be subject to
taxation in the United States and Canada but under a more
favorable framework. For US tax purposes, the investor would
benefit from variable tax rates based on the character of income
received rather than uniformly being subjected to the highest
ordinary income tax rate regardless of the source of the
income.199 Additionally, US taxpayers who do not fall into the
highest tax bracket would benefit from the tax rates of the lower
brackets determined by the level of income earned.200US
taxpayers would also avoid additional penalties for alleged
underpayment of taxes in earlier years that can result in very
high interest when compounded over extended periods of
time.201 This proposal is a natural extension of the Treaty that
seeks to reduce double taxation and facilitate cross border

198. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text (proposing exempting
Canadian mutual funds from the PFIC regime).
199. See generally supra notes 24–75 and accompanying text (underscoring the
severe tax consequences under the PFIC regime).
200. See generally supra notes 24–75 and accompanying text (explaining how
investors could benefit from lower tax rates if they qualify for a lower tax bracket).
201. See generally supra notes 24–75 and accompanying text (exploring the PFIC
tax penalty and interest).
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transactions between the neighboring countries—Canada and
the United States.202
This proposal should be adopted for several reasons. First,
including Canadian mutual funds in the PFIC regime does not
further the original legislative intent for enacting the PFIC
regime.203 Investors cannot use Canadian mutual funds as a
vehicle for tax evasion because the assets are regulated by
Canadian governing bodies and individual investors cannot
exert control.204 Canadian mutual funds also distribute all
income annually and thus, taxes are not deferred.205 Subjecting
Canadian mutual funds to the PFIC regime penalizes investors
for choosing international passive investments, rather than
simply leveling the playing field.206 In contrast, the new proposal
would level the playing field between non-US and US passive
investments, as was originally intended by the legislation.207
Second, if no change is made, given the imminent FATCA
initiation, US taxpayers will be discouraged from investing in
Canadian mutual funds and denied the benefits of this
investment class.208 The benefits include: foreign investment,
diversification, professional management, and a pooled
investment vehicle.209 Under the proposed regime, the tax
implications of investing in individual US assets and pooled

202. See generally Convention Between the United States of America and Canada
with respect to Income and Capital, U.S.-Can., Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087
(outlining the framework for the relationship between Canada and the United States
with respect to income).
203. See supra notes 154–71 and accompanying text (articulating the original
intent of the PFIC regulations and how Canadian mutual funds do not further this
intent).
204. See supra notes 96–110 and accompanying text (describing regulation of
Canadian mutual funds).
205. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (stating how Canadian mutual
funds distribute income annually, eliminating the need for this tax deferral regime).
206. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text (articulating the intent of the
PFIC regulations to level the playing field between US and non-US passive
investments).
207. See id.
208. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (identifying the challenges
with the FATCA initiation).
209. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text (noting the advantages of the
mutual fund vehicle).
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mutual fund vehicles would be identical and thus, not influence
one’s investment decision-making process.210
B. Benefits of the Proposal
This proposal resolves many of the issues for US investors in
Canadian mutual funds under the current regimes.211 If
adopted, investors would avoid the excess distribution regime’s
deferred tax interest, penalty charges, and highest marginal
ordinary tax rate.212 The proposed regime would essentially tax
PFIC’s the same as under the QEF regime without incurring the
burdensome compliance costs, filing deadlines and
complications accompanying the PFIC categorization.213
Additionally, the proposal would eliminate the regulatory costs
of the PFIC regime and uniform application of the highest
ordinary income tax rate when an investor makes the MTM
election.214
In sum, the proposal would continue to promulgate the
original purpose of the PFIC regulations without unnecessarily
imposing compliance costs, filing deadlines and other
cumbersome implications on Canadian mutual funds investors
that do not further the legislative intentions.215
CONCLUSION
Due to the overwhelming issues with the current PFIC
framework, Canadian mutual funds must be exempt from the
PFIC categorization. Perhaps the rationale for enacting the PFIC
rules is still relevant to trusts and other unregulated non-US
passive assets that can ultimately be utilized by US taxpayers to
gain favorable tax treatment. Nevertheless, it is imperative
legislators update the PFIC regime to reflect the current
210. See supra note 184–87 and accompanying text (highlighting the discrepancy
between treatment of individual securities and pooled vehicles).
211. See supra Part II (exploring the issues with the PFIC regime and Canadian
mutual fund treatment).
212. See supra notes 44–54 (identifying the challenges of the excess distribution
regime).
213. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (focusing on the QEF election
and its inefficiencies).
214. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text (outlining the MTM election).
215. See supra Part II (highlighting issues with the current PFIC framework).
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environment and, hence, exempt Canadian mutual funds. If this
change is adopted, US taxpayers will be encouraged to continue
to invest in Canadian mutual funds and reap the benefits, rather
than opting out merely because of the complexity and financial
burden of the PFIC regime.

